I n a representative democracy we are often concerned with the congruence of public preferences and the decisions of political institutions. Most often we expect that the decisions of institutions will be consistent with public preferences. However, we also know that the decisions of political institutions can influence the policy preferences of the public as well as public confidence in our political system and its institutions (Stimson 2004) . When the focus has been on the Supreme Court, scholars have indeed suggested that the Court will defer to public opinion in deciding cases (e.g., Adamany 1973; Dahl 1957; Marshall 1989) . However, the Court does not always defer to public opinion, and Court decisions may actually play a role in shaping public opinion (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra 1995; Johnson and Martin 1998; Marshall 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986 ). Indeed, many recent studies suggest that Court decisions might temporarily shape public opinion under certain conditions (see Hoekstra 2003, and Marshall 1989 , for reviews). For example, citizens who have knowledge of a decision but also have low prior interest in the issue are most likely to be influenced by a decision (Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) . But scholars continue to debate the potential influence of the Court, the conditions under which influence is possible, and whether or not observed shifts in opinion following Court decisions can be directly attributed to a Court decision (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Hoekstra 1995 Hoekstra , 2000 Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Johnson and Martin 1998) . In part, the conflicting findings may be a result of researchers using different methods and examining opinion at either the individual level or the aggregate level only.
We join this debate by examining the potential influence of Court decisions in an issue area not yet explored, gay and lesbian civil rights. Although there have only been four significant decisions by the Court on gay civil rights, each decision had significant policy implications, and the most recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) appears to be playing a central role in shaping the national debate over gay rights and same-sex marriage. Our study expands the theoretical arguments of earlier research by more fully addressing the conditional influence of the Court. We also attempt to overcome some of the limitations of previous studies by examining the potential impact of multiple Court decisions on public opinion using both aggregate and individual level analysis-previous research has only examined opinion change at the individual or aggregate level, not both.
Our analysis proceeds in four parts. First, we review and expand the theoretical literature on the ability of the Court to shape public opinion. Second, we test specific hypotheses from this literature in the context of gay rights cases and aggregate level public opinion. Third, based on the results from the second section, we analyze individual level opinion prior to and following two key Supreme Court decisions on gay rights issues to determine if shifts in opinion occur at the individual level as well. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and outline directions for future research. Our findings suggest that Court decisions can indeed shape public opinion, but the dynamics of this phenomenon may be more complex than previously believed.
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Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases A THEORY OF SUPREME COURT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION
Scholars have long argued that the Supreme Court, being concerned about its reputation, the legitimacy of its rulings, and the successful implementation of its rulings, might defer to public preferences on an issue when it makes a decision (e.g., Adamany 1973; Barnum 1985; Caldeira 1991; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Casper 1976; Dahl 1957; Flemming and Wood 1997; Funston 1975; Gates 1987; Marshall 1988 Marshall , 1989 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Monroe 1979; Norpoth et al. 1994; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995) . However, empirical studies have clearly established that the Court does not always defer to public opinion. More importantly, scholars have increasingly suggested that the Supreme Court can influence public opinion, at least temporarily and perhaps only under certain conditions (Baas and Thomas 1984; Blake 1977; Caldeira 1986; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Hoekstra 1995 Hoekstra , 2000 Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Johnson and Canon 1984; Johnson and Martin 1998; Marshall 1987 Marshall , 1989 Mondak 1990 Mondak , 1991 Mondak , 1992 Tanenhaus and Murphy 1981; Uslaner and Weber 1980; Wlezien and Goggin 1993) .
So what is the process by which actions of the Supreme Court, such as a decision in a particular case, could result in shifts in aggregate opinion on an issue and/or individual level opinion on an issue? One perspective suggests that citizens look to political elites for confirmation or refutation of their own views. If the political elite are a trusted and legitimate source of information, a conflict between the views of a citizen and those of the elite could lead the citizen to change her opinion on the issue (Bailey et al. 2003; Marshall 1989) . Likewise, citizens who do not have strong preferences on an issue might be more likely to take cues from trustworthy elites. If either process occurs for a significant number of citizens, such a shift might also be reflected in aggregate level opinion (Bailey, Sigelman and Wilcox 2003) . But this perspective also assumes that the citizen is aware of the position taken by the political elite (Marshall 1989 ).
If we treat the institution of the Supreme Court as political elite, we can argue that Court decisions legitimize the policy position taken by the Court (Blake 1977; Johnson and Canon 1984; Marshall 1987 Marshall , 1989 Uslaner and Weber 1980) . Because the public generally holds the Court in high regard relative to other political institutions, public opinion will subsequently shift toward the policy position taken by the Court (Franklin and Kosaki 1989) . This is referred to as the legitimation hypothesis, or more generally, the positive response hypothesis. But note the conditions here: Court decisions should serve as an indication of the institution' s preferences, and decisions have the capacity to shape citizen opinions only if a decision is known to a citizen, if the citizen has confidence or trust in the Court, and the citizen either has weak preferences or is willing to resolve the inconsistency between personal preferences and the Court' s indicated preference by changing her own opinion.
As the conditions for influence make clear, the role of the media is especially relevant. Citizens must rely almost entirely on the news media for information about Court decisions, and in that process, the news media serves as a filter (Davis 1994; Hoekstra 2003; Mondak 1994; Mondak and Smithey 1997) , suggesting to the public the importance of the decision and providing potentially negative, neutral, or positive perspectives on the decision. However, the news media do tend to focus on controversy and conflict (Iyengar 1991) , suggesting controversial issues will receive more coverage and that the public should be more aware of these decisions. Thus, the extent to which news media cover the decision and the content of that coverage could play a significant role in how the public responds (Hoekstra 2003) . Franklin and Kosaki (1989) and Johnson and Martin (1998) suggest that Court decisions can have a significant impact on public opinion in cases on issues that concern the entire nation. But Johnson and Martin (1998) caution that this impact will only be seen from the first Supreme Court decision on a particular issue. Johnson and Martin' s perspective is grounded in social psychology theory, which hypothesizes that once an individual forms an opinion, further elaboration will not change that opinion (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1981) . Johnson and Martin (1998: 300) argue precisely that "once the Supreme Court helps individuals elaborate their opinions, subsequent decisions within the same issue area-even if they overrule an initial landmark decision-will have little effect on public opinion." In a similar vein, some authors argue that individuals who are aware of a Court decision, but have low interest prior to the decision, tend to be more susceptible to persuasion by the Court (Hoekstra 2003; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) . Clawson and Waltenburg' s (2003) research tends to confirm the importance of how the media present an issue. They conducted an experimental study and found that media framing of the Court' s decision in an affirmative action case influenced public support for the decision. When the tone of media coverage favors one side of an issue, it seems logical that the public, which relies almost entirely on the media for its information about Supreme Court decisions, will also lean toward that side of the issue (Davis 1994; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Mondak 1994; Nicholson and Howard 2003) .
In fact, research does suggest that the public is poorly informed about the Court and that confidence in the Court does change over time (Adamany 1973; Casey 1976; Daniels 1973; Davis 1994; Dolbeare 1967; Jaros and Roper 1980; Kessel 1966; Kritzer 2001; Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968; Scherer 2003) . For example, Caldeira (1986) concludes that during periods when the Court invalidates a relatively high number of laws passed by Congress, public confidence in the Court declines. Caldeira (1986) and Caldeira and Gibson (1992) argue that during these periods the Court' s base of diffuse good will or legitimacy among citizens is challenged.
However, not all researchers believe that these conditions are necessary. For example, some authors argue that public 420 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY reaction to a Supreme Court decision is not uniform. Franklin and Kosaki (1989) argue that the response of some citizens will be consistent with the legitimation hypothesis, but other citizens may reject the Court' s position and still intensify their own opinions on the issue. Franklin and Kosaki (1989) take into account that different groups of citizens may receive the Court' s decision in different ways, depending on individual predispositions. They refer to this as the structural response hypothesis. In the case of Roe v. Wade, they argue that American Catholics were less predisposed to concur with the decision in Roe, and that their opinions on abortion would become more negative rather than more positive. In considering and testing for this type of shift in opinion, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) find a much greater impact of the Roe decision on opinion and conclude that the impact was positive for some groups but negative for others (see also Johnson and Martin 1998) .
In addition, not all scholars are convinced about the rigidity of individual opinions and suggest that major decisions by the government, changes in socioeconomic conditions, political context, and high levels of media coverage can lead citizens to reconsider their issue positions (Caldeira 1987; Hoekstra 2003; Pollock 1994; Stimson 2004) . Indeed, relatively dramatic changes in the environment, such as the nuclear accident at Three-Mile Island or the election of a new president, may lead to significant changes in public attitudes about policy issues and confidence in political institutions, especially if the change in conditions is widely covered by the news media (Adamany and Grossman 1983; Casey 1974; Pollock 1994; Stimson 2004; Stimson, Mackuien, and Erikson 1995) . Stimson (2004) argues that most of the time opinion on an issue tends to be relatively stable and reflects the opinions of those in the public who pay the most attention to politics. When dramatic events occur, such as a significant decision by a governmental institution, members of the public take notice and may shift their opinions depending on their predisposition to agree or disagree with the decision.
In the case of gay and lesbian civil rights, we are guided by the fact that attitudes toward homosexuals are consistently low. Indeed, based on national polls that use 0-100 feeling thermometers, the only group that consistently scores lower than homosexuals is illegal immigrants (Sherrill and Yang 2000; Yang 2001 ). In addition, public support for gay civil rights is strongly conditioned by attitudes toward homosexuals (Brewer 2002 (Brewer , 2003a (Brewer , 2003b Herek 2002 ). The more negative or colder feeling an individual has toward homosexuals, the less supportive she is of gay civil rights. Given this pattern, the political context of Supreme Court decisions related to gays and lesbians is generally not positive toward homosexuals. Thus, the existing body of research suggests that if the public reacts at all to a decision in this area by the Court, the reaction is likely to be negative towards lesbian and gay rights.
To this broad set of variables Marshall (1989) adds casespecific elements that might be important determinants of which decisions will influence opinion. First, Marshall argues that more liberal or activist decisions are more likely to lead to shifts in public opinion. Second, decisions in which the Court issues full, written opinions should lead to larger opinion shifts. Finally, cases involving gender and privacy are more likely to engender opinion shifts. Decisions made by the Supreme Court on gay and lesbian issues potentially meet all of these criteria, making opinion shifts more likely.
In summary, any attempt to measure change in aggregate level opinion as a result of Court decisions in a particular issue area needs to establish that there was a high degree of media coverage in the issue area and address the flavor of the political context in which decisions are issued and any changes in the socioeconomic environment. But attempting to measure opinion change at the individual level requires a more complex research design. In this case, we need polls conducted before and soon after a decision, control variables for individual demographics, and variables that capture individual predispositions. We begin with the political context.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON GAY CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC OPINION
The U.S. Supreme Court has heard arguments on four significant cases on gay civil rights: Bowers v. Hardwick (Georgia 1986 ); Romer v. Evans (Colorado, 1996) ; Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (New Jersey, 2000) ; and Lawrence v. Texas (Texas, 2003) . In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia' s sodomy law in a 5-4 vote, ruling that the Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. In the second case, Romer v. Evans, the Court, with a six-vote majority, struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment that prohibited civil rights protections for gays and lesbians. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court upheld, in a 5-4 vote, a Boy Scout policy excluding gays from joining the organization, ruling that a New Jersey law requiring the Boy Scouts to admit gays violated their First Amendment right of expressive association. In the last case, Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled its decision in Bowers (5-3, with O'Connor concurring) and struck down all state sodomy laws, including laws that banned both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, as well as those that only banned homosexual sodomy, finding that they did not further a legitimate state interest. The majority opinion also stated that the right to liberty and privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment' s Due Process Clause gives citizens the right to engage in private sexual conduct without government intervention.
Based on case-specific context, each of these cases could be argued to involve gender or privacy issues and could therefore result in significant shifts in opinion. Likewise, in each of these cases the Court issued full, written opinions, providing an additional condition under which opinion shifts might occur. The decisions in Romer and Lawrence might be viewed as liberal or activist, and each of these also involved detailed dissenting written opinions. Thus, we might expect great opinion change following these cases.
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However, none of these cases involved a unanimous decision, and each tended to reflect a divided Court, making public opinion shifts less likely. In terms of the legitimation hypothesis, in order for the public to be persuaded by Court decisions the public must first have confidence in the Court or have favorable views toward the Court. An examination of Gallup and Pew polls on favorability the year prior to each of the four cases produces the following : 1985, 64 percent; 1995, 75 percent; 1999, 65 percent; and 2002, 60 percent. Thus, prior to decisions in each case a significant majority of the public had favorable attitudes toward the Court, which meets a conditional element of the legitimation hypothesis.
The next condition is that the public be knowledgeable about a decision. Although we do not have consistent data on public knowledge of these cases, we can presume greater public knowledge when media coverage of a case is high. Table 1 displays national newspaper coverage of each case. The table also includes the coverage in the state capital newspaper for which each case originated. Overall we know that coverage of gay rights cases by the national and local media has increased significantly since the 1970s (HaiderMarkel 1999b) , and this pattern is reflected in Table 1 . We can also determine from Table 1 that each case received a fair amount of coverage and that coverage has tended to increase over time. This pattern suggests that Court decisions in these cases were highly salient in the media, making it more likely that citizens were aware of the decisions (Hoekstra 2003) .
AGGREGATE LEVEL OPINION
Over the past 30 years public support for gay civil rights has undergone a steady increase. This trend is clear in national surveys from a large number of polling firms (Brewer 2003a, b) and is reflected in the Gallup data shown in Figure 1 . Since the early 1990' s, the percentage of American adults indicating approval of legal same-sex relations has almost doubled; overall support for legal same-sex relations rose from a low of 43 percent in 1977 to a high of 60 percent in May 2003 (just prior to the Court' s decision in Lawrence), a 17 percentage point increase. Figure 1 also reveals that support for same-sex relations has dropped significantly at three points in time: 1986-1987, 1992-1996, and 2002-2003 . The first and last changes appear to coincide with the Court' s decisions in Bowers and Lawrence, both cases on sodomy laws. The 1992-96 drop in support coincides with President Clinton' s "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the Republican Party' s takeover of the U.S. House, and the Court' s decision in Romer. periods to Court decisions, this would lend some support to the arguments of Johnson and Martin (1998) , who suggested that once the Court has issued a landmark decision on an issue, subsequent decisions related to that issue will not result in opinion change. Bowers was the landmark case here, but Lawrence itself was a landmark too, since it overturned the Bowers decision. Meanwhile, the decisions in Romer (1996) and Boy Scouts (2000) are not associated with opinion change. Thus, the initial look provides some support for Johnson and Martin' s (1998) argument, but we need to exclude alternative explanations.
AGGREGATE LEVEL ANALYSIS OF OPINION: MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS
For our aggregate level multivariate model of opinion on same-sex relations we model annual public opinion on the legality of same-sex relations. For the dependent variable we use a question asked in Gallup surveys of national adults over this time period: "Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?" 2 We use the percentage of adults responding that homosexual relations should be legal in each year as our dependent variable. Our primary independent variables are the four Supreme Court decisions that directly concern gay civil rights. To measure the effect of each decision we created simple dichotomous variables coded zero for years in which the decision was not issued, and one for the year in which the decision was issued.
We also control for a number of social and institutional conditions that might influence public opinion. For example, we expect that as the number of AIDS cases per year increases, public support for legal same-sex relations will decrease. This is consistent with the attitude that AIDS was a "gay disease" in the early years of the AIDS epidemic (Cantwell 1993) . Indeed, attitudes and fears over HIV/AIDS have been linked to attitudes about homosexuality and gay rights at the individual and aggregate level (Haider-Markel 1999a; Lewis 2003; Seltzer 1993; Yang 1997 1978-1981, 1983, 1984, 1990, 1991, 1993-1995, 1997, 1998, and 2000. Broader changes in the public mood might also influence public opinion on specific issues (Stimson 1998 (Stimson , 2004 . We posit that as the public mood becomes more liberal, the percentage of the population supporting legal same-sex relations should increase. We account for this potential influence by including the percentage of the adult population identifying as liberal in the General Social Survey.
Research suggests that greater exposure to gay and lesbians is associated with favorable attitudes toward gay civil rights (Egan and Sherrill 2005; Sherrill and Yang 2000; Wilcox and Norrander 2002; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Wood and Bartkowski 2004) . If we stretch the conclusions from this line of research, we can argue that more positive mass media representations of gays and lesbians might produce more support for gay rights. To capture this potential impact we include a dichotomous variable coded one for the years during which the television show Will & Grace, which has two central gay characters, has aired, and zero for the years in which the show has not aired. In addition, we consider the notion that government policies may indeed change the hearts and minds of citizens. Opinion polls concerning discrimination against AfricanAmericans suggest that the legitimation of policies to protect blacks against discrimination is associated with a decline in public opposition to policies banning discrimination (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1997: 98-101) . Likewise, we might expect that as many states and localities adopted policies to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation over the past 30 years, citizens living in these jurisdictions may have become more supportive of gay rights, or at least made the notion of not supporting gay rights as being less politically correct. To capture this potential impact we include a variable that is the simple cumulative annual count of the number of local governments adopting ordinances to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public employment. 4 Finally, because the overall model is relatively simple, we may not be accounting for some factors that shape opinion. To capture the potential impact of unobserved forces, we also include the annual measure of opinion lagged one observation as an independent variable. legal homosexual relations. 5 Based on the model fit statistics, this model performs quite well, with 88 percent of the variation in the dependent variable accounted for. It is interesting to note the performance of the control variables in the model. None of the control variables, except the lagged dependent variable, is significantly associated with change in opinion. However, the directions of these coefficients are consistent with our expectations.
RESULTS
More importantly, the results suggest that Supreme Court decisions have an impact on public opinion in the pattern we anticipated. The Bowers decision is associated with a significant negative decrease in public support for legal same-sex relations. In fact, this single event is associated with a nearly 12-percentage point drop in public support for legal samesex relations, controlling for all other variables. The direction of the opinion shift, which is consistent with the decision in the case to uphold Georgia' s law banning sodomy, supports the legitimation hypothesis (Uslaner and Weber 1980) . And given the overall political context of the period, including fear over AIDS and a negative attitude toward homosexuals, the large negative shift in attitudes might be expected. Likewise, this was the first time the Court had ever issued a significant decision that directly addressed gay and lesbian issues, making it a landmark case in terms of gay civil rights and making a significant opinion shift more likely (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Johnson and Martin 1998) .
As would be predicted by Johnson and Martin (1998) , the Court decisions in Romer v. Evans (1996) and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) do not appear to have shaped public preferences on this issue. Recall that even though each of these decisions did receive a fair amount of coverage in the media, we did not expect to see opinion shifts following these decisions. In large part this was because neither case directly addressed the issue of legal same-sex relations. In addition, the conditional element was missing; neither case was a landmark case relative to Bowers (Johnson and Martin 1998). Even though national media coverage of each case was less extensive compared to coverage of Bowers and Lawrence, local media coverage in the states of origin was quite high, and it is possible that local opinion shifts did occur (Haider-Markel 2004) .
The context of the Lawrence decision was quite different. The decision in Lawrence was the Court' s second ruling on laws banning sodomy, and the results of our model suggest that the decision was associated with a significant shift in public opinion. Controlling for all other variables, the decision in Lawrence is associated with an eight percentagepoint drop in public support of legal homosexual relations.
Recall that the decision in Lawrence overturned existing state laws banning sodomy and the Court' s previous ruling in Bowers. In both cases the justices were divided, and in Lawrence Justice O'Connor joined the majority in overruling the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law but did not join in their decision to overrule Bowers. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented from the Court' s opinion.
In his unusually harsh dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Bowers should not be overruled because of the overwhelming reliance by courts and state legislatures on its principal holding that sexual behavior that is immoral and unacceptable is a rational basis for governmental regulation (Lawrence v. Texas 2003) . Justice Scalia even characterized overturning Bowers as a "massive disruption of the current social order" (Lawrence v. Texas 2003). Scalia' s dissent also disagreed with the majority' s decision that preserving public morality is not a rational basis for the Texas sodomy law, arguing that many laws are based on that very interest, including criminal laws against bestiality (Lawrence v. Texas 2003) . Scalia argued that even if the Texas law does deny equal protection to homosexual persons, that denial is still constitutional because it satisfies the rational basis test of furthering a legitimate state interest in protecting public morality. Finally, Scalia characterized the Court' s opinion as being "the product of a law profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda," which is not supported by the mainstream public (Lawrence v. Texas 2003). He accused the majority of taking sides in a culture war instead of being a neutral observer, arguing that it was up to state legislatures, not the courts, to decide which behaviors are moral.
As reported in Table 1 , the Lawrence case received considerable media coverage. Analysis by Haider-Markel (2004) reveals that coverage included considerable quoting of Scalia' s highly negative dissent. Furthermore, although national and local media coverage of the case from December 2002 to July 2003 was generally neutral or even biased in a positive manner, coverage of the decision itself was far more negative toward proponents of overturning the Texas law than in previous months (Haider-Markel 2004) . Likewise, although attitudes toward homosexuals have warmed considerably since the 1980s, overall feeling thermometer scores were still in the cold range at the time of the decision, and a significant portion of the American public believed, and still believes, that homosexuality is morally wrong (Egan and Sherrill 2005) .
The specifics of the decision, the high media coverage, the content of that coverage, and the political context, all help explain the negative shift in public opinion toward legal homosexual relations following the decision in Lawrence. Thus, even though Johnson and Martin' s (1998) conditional argument is likely correct in that public opinion on an issue is only likely to shift following a landmark decision by the Court, it seems clear that because Lawrence overturned the decision in Bowers, the decisions in both cases should be considered landmark decisions.
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But why did opinion turn against the thrust of the Court decision? On its face the result seems to undercut the legitimation hypothesis. But as we discussed above, the context of the decision suggests that opponents had clear authoritative language from Justice Scalia on which they could justify their opinions. In addition, even Justice Thomas provided a clear position on which one could disagree with the majority decision; that this is an issue to be decided by legislatures, not courts (Lawrence v. Texas 2003) . Thus, the results of our analysis do not undercut the legitimation hypothesis, and they provide additional support for the conditional response hypothesis.
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS
Our analysis of aggregate level opinion on legal homosexual relations suggests that Supreme Court decisions can influence public opinion in the area of gay civil rights. However, this only occurred for two of the decisions issued, and opinion shifted in the same direction even though the Court decisions came to opposite conclusions. Although the results seem convincing and are consistent with previous research in other issue areas, it leads us to wonder if the shifts in aggregate opinion are actually the aggregated result of shifts in individual level opinion following the Court decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003) .
Previous studies have uncovered shifts in individual opinion following Court decisions (Baas and Thomas 1984; Caldeira 1986; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Hoekstra 1995 Hoekstra , 2000 Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Johnson and Martin 1998; Mondak 1990 Mondak , 1991 Mondak , 1992 Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Segal 1995; Tanenhaus and Murphy 1981) . We follow the specific research design used by Franklin and Kosaki (1989) , Martin (1998), and Kritzer (2001) . In each of these studies the authors examined individual level data obtained from national surveys of adults conducted before and after Court decisions and found significant changes in opinion following those decisions. 6 Franklin and Kosaki (1989) found that the Court' s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) did influence public opinion, with citizens becoming more supportive of abortions for health reasons, and the public becoming more divided over discretionary abortions. They take into account that different groups of citizens may receive the Court' s decision in different ways, depending on their predispositions. In doing so, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) find a much greater impact of the Roe decision on opinion and conclude that the impact was positive for some groups but negative for others. Johnson and Martin' s (1998) examination of individual level opinion before and after Court decisions on abortion and the death penalty confirmed shifts in opinion result from Court decisions, but opinion only changed after the landmark case in each issue area. Thus, to confirm our findings on aggregate opinion change, we must now turn to examining individual level before and after the decisions in Bowers and Lawrence.
Model 1: Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) For our model of the influence of the Supreme Court' s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) we used data from national polls conducted in November 1985 (pre-decision) and July 1986 (post-decision). The dependent variable is again based on responses to the following question: "Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?" In November 1985, 44 percent of the respondents felt that same-sex relations should be legal, but by July 1986, this number had dropped to 32 percent. The principal independent variable for this analysis is the impact of Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) on this question: Did the Bowers decision cause individuals to alter their opinion on same-sex relations? To test the impact of Bowers, we pooled the two datasets and created a variable whereby all respondents from the November 1985 poll were assigned a zero and all respondents from the July 1986 poll were assigned a one. This variable is then our measure of the Bowers decision. We hypothesize that the Bowers decision will have a negative influence on support for same-sex relations.
We also include a number of demographic control variables in the model. Based on previous research, we expected that respondent gender, age, marital status, race, education, religiosity, income, and partisanship would influence individual support for legal homosexual relations (Bowman and O'Keefe 2004; Brewer 2002 Brewer , 2003a Brewer , 2003b Guth and Green 1993; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt 1993; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2003; Sherrill and Yang 2000; Wilcox and Wolpert 1996) .
8 Specifically, we anticipate that women, whites, the less religious, the wealthy, the highly educated, Democrats, the young, and the unmarried will be more supportive of legal same-sex relations.
Bowers's Results
Recall that the structural response hypothesis posited by Franklin and Kosaki (1989) suggests that some groups of individuals may respond differently to a Court decision. With this in mind we estimated two models; (1) a constrained model with each of the independent variables 426 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY included, and (2) an unconstrained model where each of the independent variables is interacted with the Bowers variable. Thus, in the unconstrained model we can assess how respondents with different characteristics responded, if at all, to the Court' s decision. Franklin and Kosaki (1989) and Johnson and Martin (1998) , we find that the postdecision dummy-Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the first in a line of Supreme Court decisions on homosexual rights-had a significant impact on the likelihood of supporting same-sex relations. Even accounting for respondent characteristics, those surveyed following the Bowers decision were significantly more likely to oppose legal same-sex relations. This finding is consistent with the legitimation or positive response hypothesis, which posits that individuals became less supportive of legal homosexual relations as the Court issued a decision to support this position.
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Additionally, the unconstrained model reveals a more nuanced examination of who was responding to the decision in Bowers. For example, in the unconstrained model, gender, when interacted with the Bowers postdecision variable, no longer significantly influences the likelihood of supporting legal homosexual relations. This suggests that the decision caused women to change their views of samesex relations to the extent that their opinions were no longer significantly different from those of men. In addition, whites became significantly more likely to support same-sex relations relative to non-whites. Meanwhile, Catholics and high-income earners became relatively more likely to oppose same-sex relations. The overall impact of Bowers was to make nearly all groups less supportive of legal same-sex relations, but different groups did respond in different ways. In addition, the Likelihood-Ratio test clearly establishes that opinions differed significantly between the two polls and that some groups did respond to the decision in different ways. Thus, our findings also provide some support for the structural response hypothesis. 9 To test the impact of Lawrence, we pooled the two datasets and created a variable in which all respondents from the May 2003 poll were assigned a zero and all respondents from the July 2003 poll were assigned a one. This variable is then our measure of the Lawrence decision. We hypothesize that the Lawrence decision will have a negative influence on support for same-sex relations.
We also include a number of demographic control variables in the model. Unfortunately, we are limited to questions that were asked on both surveys. And although these surveys had questions about ideology, they did not have questions regarding religiosity. Based on previous research, we expected that respondent gender, age, marital status, race, education, income, ideology, and partisanship would influence individual support for legal homosexual relations (Bowman and O'Keefe 2004; Brewer 2002 Brewer , 2003a Guth and Green 1993; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Leege Wald, and Al Kellstedt 1993; Pew Research Center 2003; Sherrill and Yang 2000; Wilcox and Wolpert 1996) . Specifically, we anticipate that women, whites, the less conservative, the wealthy, the highly educated, Democrats, the young, and the unmarried will be more supportive of legal same-sex relations. Table 4 displays the estimates from a Logit model of opinion on same-sex relations. Based on the model fit statistics, the models again perform fairly well. For each parameter, a positive coefficient indicates an increased likelihood to support legal same-sex relations. The results from the constrained model suggest that the young, whites, the highly educated, the wealthy, and liberals are more likely to support legal homosexual relations. Meanwhile, Republicans, the elderly, and conservatives are less likely to be supportive.
Lawrence's Results
As hypothesized, the postdecision dummy variable, representing the impact of Lawrence, has a statistically significant negative influence on public opinion toward legal same-sex relations, even controlling for a variety of respondent demographic characteristics. Because the two polls were conducted only two months apart, the probability that the shift in opinion is the result of the decision in Lawrence seems high.
But did different groups respond to the decision in distinct ways? The results in the unconstrained model suggest that women and liberals became somewhat more likely to support legal same-sex relations following the decision. Women especially responded in a positive manner, clearly suggesting that a gender gap has developed on this issue over time and that women were more likely to respond to the decision in a manner consistent with the legitimation hypothesis. As we saw with Bowers, the Likelihood-Ratio test clearly establishes that opinions differed significantly between the pre-and post-decision polls and that some groups did respond to the decision in different ways. Thus, in combination our results from Bowers and Lawrence find some support for the structural response hypothesis.
DISCUSSION
Our results endorse the contention that Supreme Court decisions can influence public opinion in the area of gay civil rights. In part this influence is conditional on media coverage of the case, case specific elements, and the political context in which a decision is made. The political context argument includes the notion that the ability of the Supreme Court to shape national public opinion is directly related to the policy implications associated with the decision. To understand this process we need to return to the issue of how Court decisions in an issue area can continue to influence public opinion after a landmark decision has been made (Johnson and Martin 1998) . In addition, we 428 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY need to address how it is that opposite decisions in Bowers and Lawrence influenced opinion in the same direction. First, consider patterns observed with other Court decisions. The Court' s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had significant nationwide policy implications and was perceived as a judicial activist decision involving a moral issue. This resulted in a significant shift in public opinion on abortion. However, when Johnson and Martin (1998) explored the potential impact of a second abortion decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) , on public opinion they found little evidence of any impact. Johnson and Martin (1998) argued, therefore, that the first or landmark decision in an issue area was likely to be the only one to cause shifts in opinion.
However, we believe several elements set Webster apart from Lawrence. Although the decision in Webster received significant media coverage (Johnson and Martin 1998) , we believe that the policy implications of Webster were less significant than those of Lawrence, largely because the decision in Lawrence overturned all state laws banning homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, while Webster simply allowed states to continue placing some restrictions on abortion. Indeed, the decision in Lawrence had implications for state law that more closely resembled the decision in Roe. Besides overturning all existing state laws and the Court' s original decision in Bowers, some observers and the dissenting opinion of the Court suggested that the logic of the decision might allow for legal challenges to a variety of laws regulating sexual behavior and might support the argument that bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. Media coverage of the case was extensive and the content of the coverage focused on the unusually harsh dissenting opinion of REASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 429 ϵ Justice Scalia and the arguments concerning how the ruling might be used in future cases (Haider-Markel 2004) . Lawrence also differs from the death penalty cases examined by Johnson and Martin (1998) . The first in this line of cases was Furman v. Georgia (1972) . A divided Court issued a short per curiam opinion stating: "The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." The Court did not say the death penalty itself was unconstitutional. Rather, it believed the three combined cases that made up Furman unconstitutionally applied the death penalty. In fact, Furman was so controversial that the justices themselves could not agree on why they came to that decision. In the end, they offered nine different opinions totaling more than 243 pages, making it the longest combination of decisions in Court history (Epstein and Kobylka 1992: 78-80). Following Furman, Gregg v. Georgia (1976) addressed the issue of states attempting to restructure their death penalty laws. In Gregg, the Court found that these new attempts at the law were constitutional. In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) , the Court was once again reviewing the way the death penalty was applied, as it had in Furman. This time, the Court sided with Georgia when it ruled that there was not a constitutional violation in the application of the state' s death penalty sentences. Once again, Lawrence does not abide by the same pattern seen in these previous studies. In the death penalty cases none of the decisions had such widespread policy implications.
This quick review of previous research suggests that the policy implications of a decision are likely to play an important role in determining whether or not the decision influences public opinion. Johnson and Martin (1998) had of course noted that landmark cases would provide the best conditions for change, but they suggested that even if a landmark decision were overturned, opinion change would be unlikely. Our results suggest that under specific conditions, a Court decision overruling its previous decision might be associated with shifts in opinion. Thus, Johnson and Martin' s (1998) conclusions could be slightly revised to allow an exception to their rule on subsequent Court cases when a new decision overrules a previous decision.
However, we should also consider the fact that the opposing decisions in Bowers and Lawrence resulted in similar declines in public support for legal same-sex relations. The legitimation hypothesis would suggest that opinion should shift in the direction of the Court' s decision in each case, if a shift was to be seen at all. We alluded previously to the fact that the Court' s position in Lawrence might not have been quite so clear to all observers largely because there was widespread media coverage of Justice Scalia' s strong dissenting opinion.
We also should reflect on an element not evident in other research on Court decisions and opinion. Following the landmark cases on abortion and the death penalty, public opinion shifted, but has remained relatively stable since. In the case of support for legal-same sex relations, we have noted that following Bowers there was a fairly steady increase in support (see Figure 1) . Thus, one can conclude that following Bowers public opinion was not entirely stable, and therefore, perhaps more subject to change based on changing political context, including new authoritative decisions by political institutions. In addition, the general increase in public support for gay civil rights has occurred without much of a warming in affect toward homosexuals (Yang 2001) . As such, it seems clear that support for gay civil rights issues, such as legal same-sex relations, is fairly soft in comparison to positions taken by citizens on abortion and the death penalty, making the potential for opinion shifts more likely. Finally, the shift in opinion following Lawrence in 2003 has steadily eroded so that currently, levels of support for legal same-sex relations are now nearly in line with levels prior to Lawrence (see Figure 1 ). This suggests that the impact of Lawrence was perhaps temporary, and should not be overstated.
CONCLUSION
Our research engages the literature examining the influence of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion. Although this literature has grown considerably in the last 25 years, existing studies have frequently contained theoretical and methodological problems. In addition, none of these previous studies has examined the potential influence of Court decisions in the area of gay civil rights. Our research attempts to overcome these limitations.
We begin by elucidating the variety of theories that attempt to explain how and when Court decisions might influence public opinion. We argue that a variety of factors should be taken into account, including case-specific elements, media coverage, and the political context in which a decision is made. Our combined analysis of aggregate and individual level opinion on the legality of same-sex relations allows us to draw several important conclusions.
First, the results of our aggregate level analysis reveal that Supreme Court decisions can have a significant impact on public opinion in the area of gay civil rights. Although this impact may not be found after every decision, it is clear that the possibility exists under certain conditions. In our analysis, the key factors were case specific factors: the cases had to have significant national implications and the cases had to be widely covered in the national media. In our analysis, the Court' s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003) had a significant influence on public support for legal homosexual relations, even when we controlled for a variety of other factors. Both cases were widely covered, and both cases addressed laws banning same-sex relations. Meanwhile, the decisions Romer v. Evans (1996) and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) did not impact opinion on legal same-sex relations. The lack of influence was expected because neither case directly addressed same-sex relations, received as much media attention, and had as broad of a policy impact.
Second, the finding that Bowers influenced opinion provides some support for the legitimation hypothesis. However,
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POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY the Lawrence decision, which overturned Bowers, also was associated with a decline in support for legal same-sex relations. This finding might be interpreted as running counter to the legitimation hypothesis. But our analysis suggests that the decision in Lawrence had a negative influence on support for same-sex relations because media coverage of the decision turned negative and provided mixed signals about the Court' s position by highlighting Justice Scalia' s dissenting opinion. Because our findings suggest that the decisions in Bowers and Lawrence influenced opinion, Johnson and Martin' s (1998) argument that the Court cannot alter opinion in an issue area more than once should be reconsidered. In particular our analysis suggests that if a case has significant policy implications, and overturns a previous Court decision-as occurred with Lawrence-the conditions facilitate a shift in opinion. However, these situations are relatively rare, and it seems likely that Johnson and Martin' s (1998) arguments would hold for most issue areas most of the time.
Third, previous studies of the Court' s ability to influence opinion were often methodologically limited because they employed only aggregate or only individual level opinion. We overcame this limitation and conducted confirmatory analysis of our aggregate level findings with analysis of individual level opinion from before and after the decisions in Bowers and Lawrence. Our analysis of individual level opinion confirmed the earlier findings; the decisions in Bowers and Lawrence did have a significant negative influence on individual support for legal homosexual relations, even when controlling for a variety of individual characteristics.
Fourth, our analysis of individual level opinion provided some support for the structural response hypothesis. In our analysis there were real differences in the way specific groups of individuals responded to the decisions. For example, following the Bowers decision, Catholics and the wealthy were less likely to support legal same-sex relations, while whites were more supportive than non-whites. And after the Lawrence decision, women and liberals were more likely to support legal homosexual relations. Overall, our tests of the structural response hypothesis are supportive. It is possible that examining pre-and post-decision polls for the Romer and Boy Scout decisions would reveal a larger individual level change in opinion among specific groups than was revealed by the aggregate level analysis.
Fifth, our results suggest that observers should not expect Court decisions to consistently influence public opinion-the influence of the Court is conditional. Indeed, considering that the ability of Congress and the President to influence public opinion also appears to be conditional (Bailey, Sigelman, and Wilcox 2003; Edwards 2003; Page and Shapiro 1983) , this result is perhaps not too surprising. However, given the fact that the Court does little to publicize its own decisions and that justices may or may not consider public opinion when fashioning decisions (Flemming and Wood 1997) , the fact that Court decisions ever have a significant influence on public opinion should be surprising. But we must keep in mind that few Court decisions are widely known or understood by the public. This does not downplay the role of the Court in the American political system, but it does highlight just how conditional the potential influence of the Court actually is.
Finally, future researchers could expand on our analysis by returning to previous studies and applying our more general theoretical framework as well as our methodology. Our framework and methodology could also be used to examine potential changes in public confidence in the Court that result from Court decisions. Additionally, researchers could test this framework on additional issues in the American context or apply this framework to final courts of appeal in other political systems.
